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We consider the problem of identifying coordinated influence campaigns conducted by automated agents
or bots in a social network. We study several different Twitter datasets which contain such campaigns and
find that the bots exhibit heterophily - they interact more with humans than with each other. We use this
observation to develop a probability model for the network structure and bot labels based on the Ising model
from statistical physics. We present a method to find the maximum likelihood assignment of bot labels by
solving a minimum cut problem. Our algorithm allows for the simultaneous detection of multiple bots that
are potentially engaging in a coordinated influence campaign, in contrast to other methods that identify bots
one at a time. We find that our algorithm is able to more accurately find bots than existing methods when
compared to a human labeled ground truth. We also look at the content posted by the bots we identify and
find that they seem to have a coordinated agenda.
Subject classifications : Social networks, Influence campaigns, Ising model.
1. Introduction
Social networks face the challenge posed by automated bots which create spam in the network
and result in a degraded user experience. However, recently these bots have become a serious
threat to democracies. There have been multiple reports alleging that foreign actors attempted to
penetrate U.S. social networks in order to manipulate elections (Parlapiano and Lee 2018, Shane
2017, Guilbeault and Woolley 2016, Byrnes 2016, Ferrara 2017). The perpetrators used bots to share
politically polarizing content, much of it fake news, in order to amplify it and extend its reach, or
directly interacted with humans to promote their agenda. While no one knows exactly how many
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people were impacted by these influence campaigns, it has still become a concern for the U.S. and
many other governments (Fandos and Shane 2017, Price 2018).
Social network counter-measures are needed to combat these coordinated influence campaigns.
Conventional methods of bot detection may not be sufficient because they can be fooled by modifying
certain elements of bot behavior, such as the frequency of posting or sharing content. However,
because many of these bots are coordinated, they may exhibit joint behaviors which are difficult
to mask and which allow for more accurate and robust detection. These behaviors may not be
observable by looking at accounts in isolation. Therefore, conventional algorithms which focus on
individual detection may not find these bots. What is needed is an algorithm that can simultaneously
detect multiple bots.
1.1. Our Contributions
We provide evidence that modern bots in the social network Twitter coordinate their attacks.
They do not create original content, but rather amplify certain human users by disproportionately
retweeting them. We find that the bots exhibit heterophily, which means they interact with humans
much more frequently than they interact with each other (Rogers 2010). This is the opposite of the
more common homophily phenomenon, where similar individuals interact with each other.
We use heterophily to design a new algorithm for bot detection. We utilize the Ising model from
statistical physics to model the network structure and bot labels. We show that the maximum
likelihood estimation of the bot labels in this Ising model reduces to solving a minimum cut problem,
which allows for efficient estimation. Our algorithm scales to large networks and is much faster than
modern bot detection algorithms (see Table 4).
A natural application of our algorithm is understanding the agenda of the bots’ influence cam-
paigns. We do this by analyzing the content of the detected bots. We find that the bots seem to
promote certain geo-political issues.
We emphasize that our algorithm is language agnostic and relies only on the interaction net-
work. Therefore, it can be used on social networks in many different countries without having prior
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knowledge of the language, culture, or individuals involved. Also, our algorithm is not restricted to
Twitter, and can be used on any online platform where individuals can interact with one another
(Facebook, Reddit, Instagram, etc.).
1.2. Previous Work
Originating from spam detection (Sahami et al. 1998), a significant subset of bot detection algorithms
are based on recognizing patterns of automation (Heymann et al. 2007, Gyöngyi et al. 2004, Gyöngyi
and Garcia-Molina 2005, Ntoulas et al. 2006, Castillo et al. 2007). It was observed by Malmgren
et al. (2009) and Raghavan et al. (2014) that human beings present specific circadian patterns which
can further be used for strategic timing or promotion campaigns (Li et al. 2014, Modaresi et al.),
or, in our case, to discriminate humans from bots (Zhang and Paxson 2011, Chu et al. 2012, Ghosh
et al. 2011). Posting at random times makes bots easily detectable, as shown in Gianvecchio et al.
(2011), but bots that retweet tweets of actual humans will replicate human rhythms with a lag.
Modern bots are no longer unintelligent spam accounts, and have learned how to mimic humans.
A meticulous study of the rise of social bots is presented in Ferrara et al. (2016). Social bots are
designed to interact with other users (Hwang et al. 2012, Messias et al. 2013, Boshmaf et al. 2013),
and post human-like content (Freitas et al. 2015). Not only do bots look more human, but turn out
to be half-human: Chu et al. (2012) mentions the concept of cyborgs, where a real person manages
dozens of otherwise automated accounts. Such hybrid accounts1 make the detection task extremely
challenging (Zangerle and Specht 2014, Syeed and Frier 2017).
Bot detectors also became more sophisticated, from the earliest instances (Yardi et al. 2009) to
the current state of the art (Davis et al. 2016) currently used in most applications today (Ferrara
2017, Mønsted et al. 2017, Vosoughi et al. 2018, Badawy et al. 2018). In Ferrara et al. (2016) the
authors present a taxonomy of bot detectors, from crowd-sourcing (Wang et al. 2012, Stein et al.
2011, Elovici et al. 2014, Twitter b,a) and honeypot traps (Lee et al. 2011, Paradise et al. 2017), to
1 See the example @TeamTrumpRussia, https://twitter.com/teamtrumprussia.
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user feature oriented classifiers (Davis et al. 2016, Chu et al. 2012, Benevenuto et al. 2010, Wang
2010, Egele et al. 2013, Viswanath et al. 2014, Thomas et al. 2011). Both approaches treat accounts
individually, but do not detect coordinated attacks. Extant work exists for coordinated attacks, a
few instances of which are CopyCatch for Facebook ’liked’ pages (Beutel et al. 2013), Twitter memes
(Ratkiewicz et al. 2011), and more generally Sybil detection in online communities (Benevenuto
et al. 2009, Aggarwal 2014, Cao et al. 2014, Yang et al. 2014, Ghosh et al. 2012, Tran et al. 2009,
Yu et al. 2008, Danezis and Mittal 2009, Yu et al. 2006, Wang et al. 2013, Alvisi et al. 2013, Cao
et al. 2012). Our algorithm is strongly inspired from work on image segmentation from Zabih and
Kolmogorov (2004), which was also applied to social networks in Marks and Zaman (2017) to detect
user location. To the best of our knowledge, no model for bot-human heterophilic interactions on
social networks exist, nor an efficient algorithm for joint bot detection based on such a model.
2. Data
We collected Twitter data from six different controversial events that occurred in a variety of nations
(US, France, Hungary), over various time periods (2015 to 2018), and for different durations. Some
of the events were elections in the US and Hungary. Others were for politically motivated conspiracy
theories or scandals, such as Pizzagate and Macron Leaks. Finally, there were activist groups such
as Black Lives Matter (BLM). Details of the data are shown in Table 1. The data was collected
using Twitter’s REST and STREAM APIs. For the Pizzagate, BLM 2015 and Hungary Election
datasets, we collected tweets containing relevant keywords. The US election dataset is from Littman
et al. (2016). The Macron Leaks and BLM 2016 were collected by Summers (2017b,a). In addition
to the basic content information, for each tweet we also collected the user profile.
2.1. Ground Truth Construction.
To obtain a ground truth for bot identities, we manually labeled approximately 300 accounts per
event. The accounts were randomly selected and only required to have a minimum activity level. For
each account, the labeler was given three options: human, bot, or no idea. The decision is guided
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Table 1 Twitter dataset descriptions.
Descriptive statistics
Dataset Description Time-period Number of tweets/users
Pizzagate Pizzagate conspiracy Nov-Dec 2016 1,025,911 / 176,822
BLM 2015 Black Lives Matter Jan-Dec 2015 477,344 / 242,164
US election First presidential debate Sep-Oct 2016 2,435,886 / 995,918
Macron Leaks French election scandal May 2017 570,295 / 150,848
Hungary Parliamentary election Apr 2018 504,170 / 198,433
BLM 2016 Black Lives Matter Sep 2016 1,274,596 / 545,937
by the activity patterns (number of retweets versus original tweets, volume, etc.), content of tweets
(level of creativity, replies, topic diversity), and other profile features (pictures, followers/friends
ratio, etc.). Some events occurred two or three years ago, but the labeling is based on the most
recent 2018 activity. Therefore, labelers were also given quick statistics about the account’s activity
during the event, but were explicitly told not to weigh it too much into their final decision. Statistics
for the number of accounts labeled as bots on each event are found in Table 2. We found that
approximately 10% of the accounts were labeled bots across the different datasets.
Table 2 Statistics for hand labeled accounts for each dataset.
Dataset Pizzagate BLM2015 US Election Macron Leaks Hungary BLM2016
Bot labels / 23/304 21/262 30/300 19/256 24/300 30/285
Total number of accounts
2.2. Heterophily.
We study the collective behavior of the bots. One such behavior concerns who the bots interact with
or retweet. Figure 1 shows different networks of retweeting interactions in the Pizzagate dataset by
accounts labeled by humans (see Table 2). We place the bots on the peripheral ring, humans in
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the central ring, and draw directed edges for the retweet interactions. Each network corresponds
to different node types on the edges. We see qualitatively that bots prefer to retweet humans than
other bots, and that humans prefer to retweet other humans instead of bots. This phenomenon
where members of a group do not interact with each other, but do interact with members of different
groups is known as heterophily.
Figure 1 Retweet interaction networks for Pizzagate accounts labeled by humans. Each network consists of edges
between a certain pair of account types (bots and humans).
To obtain a more quantitative measure of heterophily, we broaden the set of ground truth labeled
accounts by using a popular bot detection algorithm from Davis et al. (2016). This algorithm
provides a probability of being a bot. We chose 0.5 as our threshold for being a bot. Then for
each account, we calculated the total number of retweets it gives to humans/bots, normalized by
the number of unique humans/bots it retweets. This measures the average number of retweets per
human and retweets per bot for each account. We refer to this quantity as the retweet rate. We
then look at the distribution of the retweet rates conditioned on the nodes on each end of the
retweet edges: human to human, human to bot, bot to human, and bot to bot. In Table 3 we show
the mean retweet rates for the different retweet types. As can be seen, the bot to human mean is
much higher than the bot to bot mean. Also, the human to human mean is higher than the human
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to bot mean. To further quantify the difference, we perform a Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test on
each pair of retweet rate distributions. The p-value for the tests on each dataset are also shown in
Table 3. We find that there is a statistically significant difference between the distributions. This
supports the hypothesis that there is heterophily for the bots. It also suggests that the humans
exhibit homophily, meaning they are more likely to interact with each other than with bots. We
will use these properties to design our bot detection algorithm.
Table 3 Retweet rate and p-value of KS test for different rewteet networks. B stands for bot and H stands for
human. The zeros for the p-value mean that the p-value was less than 10−6.
Bots’ Mean Humans’ Mean KS-test p-value
Retweet Rate Retweet Rate
Dataset B → H B → B H → H H → B
B →B vs.
B →H
H→H vs.
H→B
B→H vs.
H→H
H→B vs.
B→B
US Pizzagate 0.99 0.18 0.98 0.12 0 0 0 0
US BLM 2015 0.88 0.17 0.84 0.05 0 0 0.013 0
US election 0.99 0.66 0.95 0.35 0 0 0 0
Macron Leaks 1.26 0.08 1.13 0.05 0 0 0 0
Hungary 0.73 0.25 0.75 0.21 0 0 0 0
US BLM 2016 0.4 0.23 0.45 0.15 0 0 0 0
3. Joint Detection Using the Ising Model
In this Section, we present our joint classification model. We assume we have an interaction graph
G = (V,E) of accounts with vertex set V (the accounts) and edge set E (the interactions). For
each node ui ∈ V we observe features xi and for each pair of users ui, uj ∈ V we observe interaction
features zij. The interaction features could be the number of retweets, out degree, and in-degree.
Each node i in the network has a latent variable ∆i which is one if i is a bot and zero other-
wise. We use a factor graph to model the joint distribution of the observed features and latent
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variables. We define functions φ(xi,∆i) for each i ∈ V and ψ(zij,∆i,∆j) for i, j ∈ V . We refer to
φ and ψ respectively as the node energy and link energy functions. Then given N accounts in an
interaction graph/network with node features X = {xi}Ni=1 and interaction features Z = {zij}Ni,j=1,
the probability of the observed features and latent variables is
P(X,Z,∆) =
∏N
i=1 e
−φ(xi,∆i)∏{i,j: i<j} e−ψ(zij ,∆i,∆j)
Z , (1)
where Z is the partition function. A probability model of this form which involves products of
functions of single nodes and pairs of nodes has the structure of the Ising model from statistical
physics (Ising 1925). Inference of the latent variables in general can be difficult because of the
presence of the partition function. However, it has been shown that inference problem is much easier
if one specifies certain characteristics of the model (Zabih and Kolmogorov 2004, Marks and Zaman
2017), which we do next.
3.1. Model Characteristics.
Link Energy. We begin by defining the link energy functions. First there is the case where there
is no edge between nodes ui and uj. In this case we assume that we can infer nothing about the
latent variables ∆i and ∆j, so we set the link energy to be independent of the latent variables. For
simplicity, we assume that ψ(zij,∆i,∆j) = 0 when there is no edge between i and j.
For pairs of nodes with an edge, we choose a functional form for the link energy. Suppose node
u1 has z1 retweets (its out-degree), node u2 receives z2 retweets (its in-degree), and u1 retweets
u2 a total of w12 times. If either degree is small, then the retweet edge from u1 to u2 provides
little information about node labels because occasional retweets are very common on Twitter. For
example, let u1 be a human that retweeted u2 once. If u1 retweeted no one else, the edge (u1, u2)
would increase the probability that it is a bot, though it is not. In simpler terms, the only edges
that contain information are the ones where u2 happens to be a popular target and u1 a suspiciously
active retweeter. Using these insights and following Marks and Zaman (2017) we define the link
energy as
ψ(z1,2,∆1,∆2|u1→ u2) = w12γ
1 + exp((α1/z1− 1) + (α2/z2− 1)) ,
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where γ controls the weight of the link energy relative to the node energy, and α1, α2 represent
thresholds for the in and out-degrees.
As mentioned in Section 2.2, we require heterophily in our model between the bots, and homophily
between the humans. This imposes the following constraint on the link energies when there is an
edge from ui to uj (a high energy corresponds to small likelihood):
ψ(zij,1,0|ui→ uj)≤ψ(zij,0,0|ui→ uj)≤ψ(zij,1,1|ui→ uj)≤ψ(zij,0,1|ui→ uj). (2)
The constraints above simply say that if ui retweets uj, the most likely labeling is ui is a bot
and uj is a human (ψ(zij,1,0|ui → uj)), and the least likely is ui is a human and uj is a bot
(ψ(zij,0,1|ui→ uj) ). To parameterize these energies, we introduce the constants  < λ2 <λ1 ∈ [0,1]
and set the link energies to
ψij =
wijγ
1 + exp((α1/zi− 1) + (α2/zj − 1)) ,

ψ(zij,0,1|ui→ uj) =ψij
ψ(zij,1,1|ui→ uj) = λ1ψij
ψ(zij,0,0|ui→ uj) = λ2ψij
ψ(zij,1,0|ui→ uj) = ψij.
For pairs of nodes with reciprocate edges ui → uj and uj → ui, the energy of the pair is the
aggregate of the two one-way energies. In order to efficiently infer the latent labels, the constants
λ1, λ2 and  must satisfy a set of constraints that we present in Section 4.
Node Energy. We choose a relatively simple form for the node energy. If we have no prior knowl-
edge on which accounts are bots, we set φ(xi,1) = φ(xi,0) = 0. If we have prior knowledge, perhaps
from an expert or another bot detection algorithm, we can use it for the node energy. However, it
turns out the simple uninformative energy performs quite well.
4. Inference via Minimum Cut
To find the most likely values for the labels given observed values X and Z, we want to maximize
equation (1), which is equivalent to solving
minimize
∆
∑
i
φ(xi,∆i) +
∑
i<j
ψ(zij,∆i,∆j). (3)
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It has been shown that performing the optimization in equation (3) is equivalent to finding the
minimum capacity cut on an appropriately defined graph (Boykov et al. 2001). The expression in
equation (3) can be viewed as the energy of the label configuration, so the graph on which the
minimum cut is equal to the maximum likelihood label set is referred to as the energy graph. We
now show how to construct this graph.
Figure 2 illustrates how to map an interaction network/graph into an energy graph. There is a
source node s and a sink node t in the energy graph. There are three types of edges in the energy
graph. For each node ui in the interaction graph, there is an edge from the source and an edge to
the sink: (s,ui) and (ui, t). There are also edges between every pair of nodes with an interaction
edge. For each node ui in the interaction graph, every valid s− t cut in the energy graph must either
cut the edge (s,ui) or (ui, t). If (s,ui) is cut, then ∆i = 0 and ui is a human. Otherwise, (ui, t) is
cut, ∆i = 1 and ui is a bot. This is how a cut in the energy graph maps to a label configuration.
By proper choice of the edge weights, a minimum weight cut in the energy graph will correspond to
a maximum likelihood label configuration. We now define the edge weights following the results in
Boykov et al. (2001).
Figure 2 Energy graph representation of the label configuration energy.
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For each pair of users ui, uj with an edge from ui to uj in the interaction graph, we add edges
(ui, uj) and (uj, ui) in the energy graph with weights:
c(ui,uj) = c(uj ,ui) =
1
2
(ψ(zij,1,0) +ψ(zij,0,1)−ψ(zij,0,0)−ψ(zij,1,1)) .
For each user ui, the weight of the edge (s,ui) is c(s,ui) = c
out
(s,ui)
+ cin(s,ui), where
cout(s,ui) =
1
2
φ(xi,0) +
1
2
∑
{j:i→j}
ψ(zij,0,0) +
1
4
∑
{j:i→j}
(ψ(zij,0,1)−ψ(zij,1,0)),
and
cin(s,ui) =
1
2
φ(xi,0) +
1
2
∑
{j:i←j}
ψ(zij,0,0) +
1
4
∑
{j:i←j}
(ψ(zij,0,1)−ψ(zij,1,0)).
For each user ui, the weight of the edge (ui, t) is c(ui,t) = c
out
(ui,t)
+ cin(ui,t), where
cout(ui,t) =
1
2
φ(xi,1) +
1
2
∑
{j:i→j}
ψ(zij,1,1) +
1
4
∑
{j:i→j}
(ψ(zij,1,0)−ψ(zij,0,1)),
and
cin(ui,t) =
1
2
φ(xi,1) +
1
2
∑
{j:i←j}
ψ(zij,1,1) +
1
4
∑
{j:i←j}
(ψ(zij,1,0)−ψ(zij,0,1)).
It can easily be shown that with these edge weights, the weight of an s− t cut in the energy graph
equals the energy of the corresponding label configuration in the interaction graph.
Energy Constraints. In order for the minimum weight cut to be the most likely labels, we
need the energy graph edge weights to be positive. Also, from Boykov et al. (2001), it was shown
that the link energies had to satisfy the condition ψ(z,1,1) +ψ(z,0,0)≤ψ(z,1,0) +ψ(z,0,1). This
condition made the energy function from equation (3) submodular and also solvable via minimum
cut. Finally, we have the heterophily constraint from equation (2). We express these constraints in
terms of λ1, λ2 ,and . First, heterophily gives
0< < λ2 <λ1 < 1. (4)
Submodularity gives
= λ2 +λ1− 1 + δ, (5)
for some δ≥ 0. We choose δ= 0 and find that edge weight positivity gives
0≤ λ2− 1
2
(1− )⇐⇒ 2≤ 3λ2 +λ1. (6)
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5. Results
In this section, we present the results of the performance of our bot detection algorithm based on
the human labelers’ ground truth. In addition to the 300 hand labeled accounts for each event,
we also include all the Twitter verified users. Verified users have undergone robust identity checks
from Twitter in order to receive such label. This increases the number of ground-truth labels by
approximately one to two thousand. We compare our performance to the state of the art bot
detection algorithm known as BotOrNot (Davis et al. 2016). In the results presented, (α1, α2) =
(100,100), except for BLM2016, where the volume of interactions is much bigger. There we set
(α1, α2) = (100,1000). For all events we set γ = 1, λ1 = 0.8, λ2 = 0.6 and = 0.4. (λ1, λ2) is picked
as the barycenter of the feasible region defined by constraints (4), (6) while  is determined by
setting δ= 0 in (5) as we want  as small as possible. As we consider the case of null node energies
φ(xi,∆i) = 0, the choice of γ does not impact the optimal cut, and only intervenes in computing
the marginal probability of belonging to each class. We do not tune this parameter, and fix it to
γ = 1, in order for the link energy differences to scale with the number of retweets wij.
Figure 3 ROC curves for bot detection algorithms on different Twitter datasets.
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Table 4 AUC and runtime for our Ising model based bot detection algorithm and BotOrNot on different
Twitter datasets.
AUC Runtime
Dataset
Ising
Model
Bot
or Not
Ising
Model
Bot
or Not
Pizzagate 0.91 0.81 ≈5 min 3.5s×170,000
BLM 2015 0.67 0.73 ≈10 min 3.5s×240,000
US election 0.83 0.82 ≈20 min 3.5s×300,000
Macron Leaks 0.84 0.72 ≈5 min 3.5s×150,000
Hungary 0.83 0.71 ≈5 min 3.5s×200,000
BLM 2016 0.91 0.84 ≈4 hours 3.5s×545,000
To evaluate the algorithms performance, we use the inferred labels to calculate the marginal
probability of being a bot for each node. This allows us to calculate receiver operating characteristic
(ROC) curves for our algorithm and compare it to BotOrNot. We show the ROC curves in Figure
3. In Table 4 we present the area under the curve (AUC) metric for the algorithms along with their
run-time. We note that for BotOrNot, the run-time is the time it takes to query its API, which
may include additional delays beyond computation time. Therefore, the runtimes for BotOrNot are
an upper bound to the actual computational time. From Figure 3 and Table 4 it can be seen that
our algorithm usually performs better than BotOrNot in terms of AUC. The one exception is BLM
2015. We suspect here that the coordinated bot campaigns we are trying to detect were not as
prevalent. Our algorithm runs on several hundred thousand accounts in several minutes to a few
hours.
We find that we have much fewer false positives than BotOrNot. One of the reason is that
BotOrNot labels news broadcasting accounts as bots. Examples of this in our datasets include the
Twitter accounts for Newsweek, CNN, and the New York Times.2 Because our Ising model algorithm
looks for who the accounts interact with and also who interacts with the accounts, we do not mistake
2As per the documentation on their website, bot scores were updated on May 10, 2018. The later problem seems to
have been fixed, since the aforementioned verified news broadcasting accounts are now given low bot scores. However,
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these trusted news sources for bots. BotOrNot uses mainly the account behavior, so the high activity
of these accounts make them appear like bots.
In addition to the increased accuracy and fast runtime, our algorithm relies on much less infor-
mation than BotOrNot (recall that we use uninformative node energies). This shows that there is
a great deal of information in the interaction graph which maps out the retweet behavior of the
accounts.
Bot Agenda. A way to understand the underlying agenda of bot designers is by looking at the
content of the tweets posted by the bots. After applying our bot detection algorithm to an event,
we look at the hashtags used by the bots, but not by the humans. Figure 4 illustrates the results of
such analysis on the Pizzagate and Macron Leaks datasets.
In Pizzagate, the bots try to export the controversy outside of the US, by transforming the usual
#WakeUpAmerica into # WakeUpBritain, and #WakeUpFrance. Similar intent can be seen in the
Macron Leaks analysis, with the use of the #furherMerkel and #stopGlobalists hashtags. In both
cases, it looks like bots intend to internationalize an otherwise local controversy in order to reach
a broader audience, especially that of western Europe. It appears as if the bots are trying to shift
the theme of the conversation to certain types of controversies (instability of Europe, Brexit, Frexit,
etc.).
6. Conclusion
We have presented an Ising model for the probability of bot labels in a social network. Our model was
motivated by the observation of heterophily in bot interactions. We infer the bot labels efficiently by
solving a minimum cut problem. We find our joint detection algorithm outperforms current existing
algorithms. This may be due to the fact that the bots are coordinated. Individual detection does
not allow one to take advantage of the coordinated behavior. We also find that our algorithm is able
to discern bot accounts from just active trusted news source accounts, in contrast to other popular
regular users that have no bad intentions, but use automation softwares to gain popularity would still be mistaken
with bots, although they are in no way involved in any influence campaign.
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Figure 4 Word clouds of hashtags used during (left) Pizzagate and (right) Macron Leaks by bots and not by
humans.
algorithms. This is a result of our incorporation of the joint interactions of all accounts. Analysis of
the content of the bots reveals that they seem to have an agenda focused on controversial topics.
We feel that for these types of coordinated campaigns, joint detection is much more effective than
individual detection.
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